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Abstract
The hypotheses of non-addiction, myopia and rational addiction are
tested using annual, quarterly and monthly data. Changes in the prices of
Japanese cigarettes can be viewed as exogenous from the point of view of
consumer behavior, because the Japanese government controls cigarette
prices. The empirical results of this paper support the addiction hypoth-
esis. The short-run and long-run price elasticities range from -0.338 to
-0.421, and from -0.679 to -0.686, respectively; thus, increases in tax rev-
enues in the long-run are likely to be smaller than those in the short-run.
As a result, tax increases would be an eective means of curbing smok-
ing and reducing its social cost. Furthermore, the debt compensation
programs for the Japan Railway and the National Forestry will not go
according to plan, unless revenues are increased in the future.
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1 Introduction
Because smoking is harmful to human health, many countries have instituted
various anti-smoking policies. For example, the 192 members of the World
Health Organization (WHO) unanimously adopted the Framework Convention
on Tobacco Control (FCTC), aimed at curbing tobacco-related deaths and dis-
ease, on May 21, 2003. This was the first international treaty negotiated under
the auspices of the WHO. In Japan, smoking has also become a hot topic in the
mass media and the Diet. The Health Enhancement Act (HEA; in Japanese,
Ken Kou Zou Shin Ho) was implemented on May 1, 2003, and consisted, pri-
marily, of anti-smoking legislation. Many policies and tools were mentioned in
the FCTC and HEA, and an increase in cigarette taxes was clearly an important
and common goal of the two acts. Thus, a clarification of the effect that tax
increases are likely to have on cigarette consumption is important.
Cigarette consumption and the prevalence of smoking in Japan have been
much higher than comparable rates in other developed countries. The WHO has
pointed out that the provisions of the Japanese anti-smoking policy have been
very lax, as compared to those of other developed countries. This observation
raises the question of whether Japanese anti-smoking policies, and especially
tax increases, will actually reduce cigarette consumption.
In order to eliminate some of the enormous debts of the Japan Railway and
the National Forestry, the Japanese Government raised the cigarette tax rate
after 1998 by introducing the ’Tobacco Special Tax’; this tax is an earmarked
tax. The increase in tax revenues accruing to the Japanese government from the
’Tobacco Special Tax’ is anticipated to be 260 to 280 trillion yen (about 2.413
to 2.598 trillion dollars in 2000 dollars) during the period 2000-2059. However,
it is not clear that these revenues will be realized according to plan, or what the
effects of this tax will be on overall tax revenues from cigarette taxation and on
the social cost of smoking.
In addition, a new tobacco tax, called the ’Tobacco Health Tax,’ was intro-
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duced on July 1, 2003. Based on the HEA, this tax was intended to decrease
cigarette consumption and to increase tax revenue, thereby decreasing the deficit
of the annual budget, a budget that had been reduced, due to gloomy economy
prospects. However, the amount of revenue that the tax will actually generate,
as well as the effects that the new tax1 will have on smoking behavior, remain
unclear.
Since the social cost of smoking is very high, tobacco control is necessary;
thus, an important issue in this respect is the question of which tobacco control
policy will be most effective for Japan.
Chaloupka (1991), Becker, Grossman and Murphy (BGM, 1994), Bardsley
and Olekalns (1999), Escario and Molina (2001), and many other authors2 have
provided empirical results in support of the rational addiction model. The effect
of anti-smoking policies, e.g., a workplace smoking ban, has been analyzed by
Evans et al (1999) and by Bardsley and Olekalns (1999); their results support
the view that workplace smoking bans reduce smoking. It is not yet clear,
however, which hypothesis best characterizes the behavior of Japanese cigarette
consumers. Specifically, is their behavior non-addictive, myopic, or rationally
addictive?
This paper analyzes cigarette consumption in Japan during the period 1955-
2003 from the point of view of addictive behavior3. Models of non-addiction,
myopia, and rational addiction are tested respectively. The results support
the rational addiction model, but reject the non-addiction and mypic addiction
model. The long-run price elasticity is larger than that in the short-run. Thus,
1According to Merriman (2001) and Goel (2004), higher tobacco tax rate may cause
cigarette smuggling. The cigarette smuggling in Japan is not analyzed here.
2Bask and Melkersson (2004) analyze two addictive goods, alcohol and cigarette. Here,
only one addictive goods, cigarette smoking is analyzed.
3The price elasticity of demand for Japanese cigarettes was estimated by Saito (1991). In
the book, National Accounts, Saito estimated the price elasticity of demand for cigarettes to be
−0.46, using data from the Japanese Household Consumption Expenditure survey. However,
some aspects of his analysis left room for improvement, such as parts of the model and the
sample, among other things. First, the analytic model used was static, because cigarettes were
considered to be non-addictive goods. If smoking addiction were to be considered, the analytic
model would have to be dynamic. Second, the sample included only worker households, not
all households. Furthermore, the time-series data were for the period from 1954 to 1984; thus,
cigarette consumption after 1985 was not analyzed.
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increases in tax revenues in the long-run are likely to be smaller than those in
the short-run.
The models employed in this paper do not address the effects of advertising,
public knowledge about the health hazards of smoking4, demography, and other
issues, because data on these variables are not currently available.
This paper is organized as follows. Smoking in Japan is described in Section
2. Rational, myopic, and non-addiction models are outlined in Section 3. The
data and estimation techniques are presented in Section 4, and the empirical
results are reported in Section 5. Japanese tobacco policy is analyzed in Section
6. Section 7 concludes the study.
2 Tobacco in Japan
2.1 Aggregate and per capita consumption
We have the cigarette consumption data in Japan from 1955 to 2002. Aggregate
consumption (in packs) grew continuously, with growth accelerating until 1977
and decelerating after 1978. While cigarette consumption per capita increased
greatly until 1977, it was relatively static, experiencing only a slight decrease,
after 1978.
2.2 Smoking prevalence
There are data on the prevalence of smoking among Japanese adults from 1958
to 2000. There was a downward trend in smoking for males, but a stable trend
for females. Figure illustrates the prevalence of smoking among Japanese adult
males by generation. All generations exhibited downward trends. Figure 2
illustrates the smoking prevalence for all generations of Japanese adult females.
The younger generations exhibited an upward trend, while the older generations
exhibited downward trends.
4For example, Hsieh (1998) analyzes this point.
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2.3 Cigarette industry and imports
The Japan Tobacco and Salt Corporation was started in 1949 and run by the
Japanese government. It was then reorganized into Japan Tobacco Inc. in 1985,
in accordance with Japan’s Tobacco Industry Law (in place from 1985). The
Ministry of Finance owned all Japan Tobacco Inc. stock until 1994, at which
time one-third of the stock was sold to various private companies. At present,
the Ministry of Finance continues to own two-thirds of the stock. It is indicating
that the Japanese government has maintained a monopoly over the Japanese
cigarette industry.
The ratio of imported cigarettes to total cigarettes consumed continued to
rise, and increased remarkably in 1987, due to the removal of the import tax.
2.4 Tobacco taxes and pricing
The tobacco tax was set by the ’Tobacco Tax Law’ and the ’Local Tax Law.’ In
May of 1999, the national tobacco tax rate was 2,716 yen per 1,000 cigarettes. In
addition, the rate of the ’Tobacco Special Tax’ was 820 yen per 1,000 cigarettes,
and the rate of the ’District Tobacco Tax’ was 3,536 yen per 1,000 cigarettes, of
which 868 yen was to be distributed to prefectures, and 2,668 yen of that sum
was to go to cities, towns and villages.
Nominal cigarette prices rose seven times as a consequence of successive
cigarette excise tax increases during the period 1955-2003. The real price of
cigarettes greatly declined during the period 1955-1974 because of an increasing
consumer price index (CPI). After 1974, real prices experienced a slight increase
due to a surge in nominal prices (Figure 3).
2.5 Tax revenues
Each year, when the annual budget is formulated in the Diet, the Japanese
government decides the target figure for tobacco tax revenues for the follow-
ing year. The total revenue from tobacco taxes in the 1999 fiscal year was
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2,322,100 million yen (about 21,547 million dollars in 2000 dollars), whereas
revenue from the national tobacco tax was 905 billion yen (about 8.398 billion
dollars in 2000 dollars). The ’Tobacco Special Tax’ was 273,600 million yen
(about 2,538.799 million dollars in 2000 dollars), of which the tobacco tax to
prefectures was 276,400 million yen (about 2.564.781 million dollars in 2000 dol-
lars), and the tobacco tax to cities, towns and villages was 867,100 million yen
(about 8,046.026 million dollars in 2000 dollars) from that sum.
Figure 4 illustrates the real cigarette tax revenues collected and real cigarette
prices from 1955 to 2002. Real tax revenues exhibited an upward trend from
1955 until the end of the 1970s, while they exhibited a downward trend from
1980 to 2002. Conversely, real prices of cigarettes declined from 1955 to the
end of the 1970s, while they increased slightly from 1980 to 2002. Thus, real
cigarette tax revenues moved in a direction opposite to that of real cigarette
prices.
2.6 Social cost
According to ’Tobacco control measures in the 21st century,’ a report issued
by the Ministry of Health and Welfare in Japan, the extra medical expenses
incurred as a result of smoking were 1.2 trillion yen (about 11.13 billion dollars
in 1993 dollars) in 1993, which was just equal to the national tax revenue from
cigarettes.
As indicated by Goto (1996), the total social cost to the Japanese of having
a cigarette industry was 5.6 trillion yen (about 39.64 billion dollars in 1993
dollars), while the total economic benefit was 2.8 trillion yen (about 19.82 billion
dollars in 1990 dollars) in 1990. Thus, the total social loss due to smoking was
2.8 trillion yen (about 19.82 billion dollars in 1990 dollars).
Therefore, from the economic point of view, tobacco control is necessary.
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2.7 Tobacco control
The Statistics of Tobacco Control Country Profiles (WHO Reports 2001) re-
ported that the national tobacco control provisions in Japan were much less
restrictive than those in other industrialized countries. For example, provisions
in the following four areas were voluntary and not nationally legislated or reg-
ulated:
(1) Advertising and Sponsorship: advertising bans (cinema, internet, radio
and television) and sponsorship restrictions; (2) Health Promotion and Educa-
tion: institution of health education curricula or programs and public informa-
tion initiatives; (3) Sales and Distribution Restrictions: the prohibition of free
products or samples, the restriction of tobacco sales to certain locations, and
the prohibition of the sale of smokeless tobacco; (4) Smoke-Free Indoor Air Re-
strictions: prohibition in air crafts, educational facilities, government worksites,
health care facilities, workplaces, etc.
The prevalence of smoking among Japanese adults and youth has also been
very high. Japan has been regarded as a ’smokers’ heaven,’ largely as a result
of the lack of tobacco controls and the high prevalence of smoking.
3 Analytical Models
3.1 Rational addiction
The theoretical model employed here follows BGM (1994). Consumers are as-
sumed to be infinitely-lived and to maximize their lifetime utility, which is
discounted at the rate r. The consumer’s problem can be stated as
max
∞∑
t=1
βt−1U(Ct, Ct−1, Yt, et). (1)
s.t.
∞∑
t=1
βt−1(Yt + PtCt) = A0
β = 1/(1 + r)
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Here, Ct, Ct−1 are the quantities of cigarettes consumed in periods t and t-1,
respectively. Yt is the consumption of the composite commodity in period t,
and et reflects the impact of unmeasured life-cycle variables on utility. The
composite commodity, Y , is taken as the numeraire, so the price of cigarettes in
period t is denoted by Pt. The rate of interest is assumed to equal the rate of
time preference. β is the time discount factor. A0 is the present value of wealth.
The associated first-order conditions are
Uy(Ct, Ct−1, Yt, et) = λ, (2)
U1(Ct, Ct−1, Yt, et) + βU2(Ct+1, Ct, Yt+1, et+1) = λPt. (3)
The utility function considered is quadratic in Yt, Ct, and et. By solving the
first-order condition for Yt and Ct, a linear difference equation can be derived,
Ct = α + θCt−1 + βθCt+1 + θ1Pt + θ2et + θ3et+1, (4)
where 5
α = −λ(uy1 + βuy2)
θ =
−(u12uyy − u1yu2y)
(u11uyy − u21y) + β(u22uyy − u22y)
θ1 =
uyyλ
(u11uyy − u21y) + β(u22uyy − u22y)
θ2 =
−(uyyu1e − u1yuey)
(u11uyy − u21y) + β(u22uyy − u22y)
θ3 =
−β(uyyu2e − u2yuey)
(u11uyy − u21y) + β(u22uyy − u22y)
.
A good is addictive if θ > 0 and the degree of addiction increases with θ.
The roots of the difference equation (4) are
φ1 =
1− (1− 4θ2β)1/2
2θ
, φ2 =
1 + (1− 4θ2β)1/2
2θ
, (5)
5There seems to be a misprint in BGM (1994). According to my calculations, the last
multiplicative term in the numerator of the formula for θ3 should be u2yuey instead of u2yu2e.
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and the stability conditions are
4θ2β < 1, φ1 < 1, φ2 > 1. (6)
Given these roots, the temporary current, past, and future price effects are
dCt
dPt
=
θ1
θφ2
(7)
dCt
dPt−1
=
θ1
θ(φ2)2
(8)
dCt
dPt+1
=
θ1φ1
θφ2
. (9)
All roots are negative, since θ1 is negative.
The short-run price effect is
dCt
dP ∗
=
θ1
θ(1− φ1)φ2 (10)
and is defined as the impact of a reduction in current and all future prices on
current consumption, with past consumption held constant.
The long-run price effect is
dC∞
dP
=
θ1
θ(1− φ1)(φ2 − 1) (11)
and is defined as the effect of a permanent reduction in prices in all periods.6
3.2 Myopic addiction
Following BGM (1994), the myopic consumer is assumed to fail to consider the
impact of current consumption on future utility and future consumption. Future
price and consumption changes have no impact on the current consumption of
a myopic addict. Under the scenario detailed in Fenn et al. (2001), the myopic
6See BGM (1994) for details.
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consumer faces a one-period problem:
maxU(Ct, Ct−1, Yt, et). (12)
s.t. Yt + PtCt = At,
where At is period t income. The solution is
Ct = η + γCt−1 + γ1Pt + γ2et, (13)
where
η = −λuy1
γ =
−(u12uyy − u1yu2y)
(u11uyy − u21y)
γ1 =
uyyλ
(u11uyy − u21y)
γ2 =
−(uyyu1e − u1yuey)
(u11uyy − u21y)
.
The demand equation of a myopic addict is entirely backward-looking, and
current consumption depends only on current price, lagged consumption, the
consumer’s marginal utility of wealth, and current events. Current consumption
is independent of both future consumption, Ct+1, and future events, et+1.
3.3 Non-addiction model
The ’non-addiction’ model addresses the case in which γ equals 0 in equation
(13). Here, current consumption depends only on current prices. This is a
very common model of consumption demand and can be found in a standard
textbook.
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4 Data and Estimation Techniques
4.1 Data
The data consist of yearly, quarterly and monthly time-series for the period
from January 1955 to September 2003, where the yearly data are based on the
Japanese fiscal year. The quarterly and monthly data are adjusted by X-12
ARIMA.
Ct denotes cigarette consumption in packs per capita. These data are taken
from the ’Japan Tobacco Association’ and ’Public Finance Statistics’; the data
consist of total sales data of cigarettes, and are divided into three subsets,
according to the age of smokers: the smoking population aged ten and over, the
smoking population aged fifteen and over, and the total population of smokers.
Pt denotes the average real retail cigarette price per pack, which is equal to
the Tobacco Price Index divided by the CPI. These data come from the ’Annual
Report on the Consumer Price Index’ and the ’Monthly Report on the Retail
Price Survey.’
Yt corresponds to real household disposable income per capita and is equal
to total disposable income divided by the total population and the CPI. These
yearly and quarterly data come from the ’Report on National Accounts.’ Sim-
ilarly, the monthly data come from the ’worker household disposable income’
section of the ’Annual Report of Family Income and Expenditure’ and, likewise,
represent total disposable income per family divided by the total population.
∆Yt is the first difference of Yt.
Taxt denotes real cigarette tax revenue per capita in a given fiscal year, and
is equal to total national tobacco tax revenue divided by the CPI and the total
population. These data come from the ’Public Finance Statistics.’
Table 1 presents the means, standard deviations, and other indicators for
the primary variables in the data set.
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4.2 Unit root tests
If any of the variables were revealed to be nonstationary, then some problems
would arise in the statistical inference using Ordinary least-squares (OLS) and
two-stage least-squares (2SLS). Therefore, I test whether each variable is sta-
tionary. The ADF test and Phillips-Perron test (1988) are used for this purpose,
and the results are presented in Table 2.
The hypotheses of unit roots for Ct, Pt and ∆Yt are rejected at the 10%
significance level, so these variables are considered to be either stationary or
time-trend stationary. Since the unit root hypotheses for the quarterly and
monthly Yt cannot be rejected at any conventional significance level, I conclude
that Yt is not stationary. If Yt were used in OLS and 2SLS, a bias might arise;
therefore, I use ∆Yt.
4.3 Estimation techniques
OLS and 2SLS are used to obtain parameter estimates. The OLS estimates may
not be consistent because of the endogeneity of past and future consumption,
and also because of the possibility of serial correlation of the residuals. There-
fore, to insure that consistent estimates are obtained, I also use 2SLS methods.
The 2SLS estimates are consistent under the instrumental variables approach7.
The cigarette price is totally controlled by the Japanese government. There was
a special law for every increase of cigarette tax. The seven times of cigarette
tax increase were done by Japanese government not because of the situation of
cigarette demand but because of the heavy deficit of public finance8. Thus the
tax (or changes in cigarette prices) is an exogenous variable for the cigarette
consumer. Furthermore, price is strongly correlated with cigarette consump-
tion; thus, it is thought to be a good instrument for cigarette consumption.
Price lags are used as the instrumental variables for past cigarette consump-
7Auld and Grootendorst (2004) point that aggregate data tend to yield spurious evidence in
favor of the rational addiction hypothesis. But it is also pointed in the 9th page of their paper
that instrumental variable estimates of the coefficients on the lag and lead of consumption are
consistent if prices are exogenous.
8See ’The History of Japanese Tobacco Monopoly’ (in Japanese, Nihon Tabako Senbaishi).
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tion, while price leads are used as the instrumental variables for future cigarette
consumption. Finally, the Wu test is used to determine whether OLS estimates
are consistent.
5 Empirical results
5.1 Non-addiction and myopic addiction
The estimated values for the myopic and non-addiction models are reported in
Table 3 9(Ct is divided by the population aged 15 and over). The ’non-addiction’
column presents the parameter estimates for the non-addiction model. The ’ba-
sic’ column presents the parameter estimates for the basic myopic addiction
model. All coefficients from the OLS and 2SLS regressions are significant at
the 1% level. In the Wu test, the hypothesis that the OLS estimates are con-
sistent cannot be rejected at the 5% level; therefore, the OLS estimates can be
considered efficient when compared to those from the 2SLS procedure.
The ’non-addiction’ model corresponds to the case in which γ = 0 in equation
(13). The OLS coefficient of Ct−1 in the ’basic’ model is significant at the 1%
level. Thus, the ’non-addiction’ model is not supported.
The ’expanded’ column presents the parameter estimates for the expanded
myopic addiction model. When the one-period lead price is added to the basic
myopic addiction model, its OLS coefficient is significant at the 5% level, and
its 2SLS coefficient is significant at the 1% level. These results suggest that
current consumption depends on future prices. Thus it rejects myopic addiction
model but is consistent with a rational addiction hypothesis. In a rational
addiction model, a reduction in future prices brings about higher expected future
consumption, which, in turn, raises current consumption. Hence, these results
challenge the validity of the myopic addiction model. The hypothesis in the Wu
test, that the OLS estimates are consistent, cannot be rejected at the 5% level.
9The results based on yearly data are reported here. Other results, which are based on
quarterly and monthly data, are very similar to those derived from the yearly data and are
thus not reported here. The omitted results are available upon request from the author.
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5.2 Rational addiction
5.2.1 Ct divided by the smoking population aged 15 and over
The estimated parameter values for the rational addiction model are reported
in Table 4 (Ct is divided by the smoking population aged 15 and over). The
’yearly,’ ’quarterly,’ and ’monthly’ columns present the estimates for the rational
addiction model using yearly data, quarterly data,10 and monthly data11. The
three results are very similar.
The hypothesis in the Wu test that the OLS estimates are consistent cannot
be rejected at the 5% level. Thus, the OLS estimates are considered consis-
tent and efficient. The OLS and 2SLS coefficients on Ct−1, Ct+1 and Pt are
significant, and these results provide sound support for the rational addiction
model.
The OLS and 2SLS coefficients on Yt in the ’yearly’ column are positive
but are not significant at any conventional level. These results suggest that
current consumption does not depend on real disposable household income.
The coefficient on ∆Yt in the ’quarterly’ column is also not significant. The
coefficient on ∆Yt in the ’monthly’ OLS column is significantly negative.
The estimated values satisfy the stability conditions given in equation (6).
The rational addiction hypothesis is strongly supported by all three results.
Using these coefficients and the sample means from Table 1, I estimate the
short-run and long-run price elasticities, which are shown in the rows labeled
’short-run ’ and ’long-run .’ The long-run price elasticity is about two times
as large as that for the short-run.
According to the results derived from the yearly data, a 10-percent perma-
nent increase in the price of cigarettes should reduce current consumption by
3.38 percent in the short-run, and by 6.59 percent in the long-run.
10Following another paper of the author’s, the rates of tax increase are used as proxies for
inventory in the estimated equation. The estimates of the coefficients on the proxies are not
reported here, though there is a large inventory effect. The omitted results are available upon
request from the author.
11Following another paper of the author’s, dummies are used as proxies for inventory in the
estimated equation. The coefficient estimates for the proxies are not reported here but are
available upon request. The inventory effect is large.
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5.2.2 Ct divided by the total population of smokers
In this case, the coefficient on price is not significant, and the stability condition
is not satisfied. The rational addiction model is not supported, while the myopic
addiction model is supported, possibly because consumers are not given the
choice to quit smoking in the latter model. This result is not contradictory to
the sense of the rational addiction model, because, in that model, the consumer
has the option to quit.
5.2.3 Comparison with the U.S.
According to BGM (1994), the short-run price elasticity (taken from annual
U.S. data) ranged from −0.355 to −0.407, and the long-run price elasticity
ranged from −0.734 to −0.788. The short-run and long-run price elasticities in
Japan were −0.338 and −0.659. Thus, the absolute values of the short-run and
long-run price elasticities in Japan are near to those in the U.S.
6 Policy analysis
6.1 Debt compensation and the reduction of pure social
cost
Because of the Japanese government’s monopoly of the tobacco industry, cigarette
prices are entirely controlled via adjustments in cigarette tax rates. High tax
rates increase cigarette prices for consumers.
The cigarette tax rate was raised in 1998. According to the ’Tobacco Special
Tax,’ an extra tax of 820 yen per thousand cigarettes was imposed.
A new tax called the ’Tobacco Health Tax’ was introduced on July 1, 2003.
The total increase in tax revenues resulting from the ’Tobacco Health Tax’ is
anticipated to be about 240 trillion yen.
The increase in tax revenues accruing to the Japanese government as a result
of the ’Tobacco Special Tax’ is anticipated at 260 to 280 trillion yen. Because
15
the long-run price elasticity is about two times as large as the short-run price
elasticity, the long-run increase in tax revenues will be much smaller than that
in the short-run. According to my calculations (Table 5), the increase in tax
revenues will be less than 260 billion yen after 2003, because of the ’Tobacco
Health Tax’. Therefore, the debt compensation programs will not go according
to plan.
According to Goto (1996), the pure social cost of smoking was 173.913 yen
per pack in 1990. The reduction of pure social cost resulting from the ’Tobacco
Special Tax’ and from the ’Tobacco Health Tax’ is estimated in Table 5, in
which I also assume that all other conditions are unchanged. The reduction of
the pure social cost of smoking should become greater with time and should be
much greater than the reduction that accrues in the increased tax revenue.
6.2 Better policy for tax revenue
The smoking rate for Japanese males has declined. One can infer from the trend
of smoking rate (or the minus coefficient of time in the Table 4) that consumers
will probably reduce cigarette consumption gradually in the future, because
of a greater awareness of health hazards, among other reasons. Thus, total
cigarette consumption should decrease in the long-run. Although the current
policy for total tax revenue maximization in the long-run is a lower tax rate
in an unchanged smoking environment, a better policy for raising tax revenue
would be to increase the current tax rate, if the government expects consumers
to reduce their cigarette consumption in the future. Therefore, increases in
the ’Tobacco Special Tax’ and the ’Tobacco Health Tax’ should be considered
as better policies for raising tax revenue. In addition, the absolute value of
the long-run price elasticity is smaller than one, and thus tax increases should
increase total tax revenues.
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6.3 Tobacco control
Due to the enormous social cost of smoking, the WHO and many other groups
have proposed tobacco control policies. The Japanese government has also in-
troduced many tobacco control provisions, most of which have been voluntary.
Because price increases tend to have a negative effect on consumption, an in-
crease in the cigarette tax would be an effective means of further tobacco control.
Furthermore, such increases would be most effective in the long-term, since con-
sumers are more sensitive to events taking place in the long-run than they are
to those that occur in the short-run.
7 Conclusion
Japanese cigarette consumption has been analyzed in this study using non-
addiction, myopic and rational addiction models. This analysis obtains some
evidences that are not consistent with the non-addiction and myopic addiction
hypotheses but consistent with the rational addiction hypothesis. The real
cigarette price has a negative effect on consumption, while the effect of real
household disposable income on consumption is not significant. The long-run
price elasticity is about two times as large as the short-run elasticity. Thus,
any long-run increase in tax revenues resulting from higher tax rates is likely to
be much smaller than that in the short-run. The debt compensation programs
of the Japan Railway and the National Forestry will not proceed according to
plan, as the ’Tobacco Health Tax’ was imposed on July 1, 2003. On the other
hand, these price increases should reduce the total social cost resulting from
smoking and should constitute a good anti-smoking policy, bearing in mind the
current state of regulations that are otherwise lax in Japan.
In this paper, the models do not treat the effects of advertising, public
knowledge about the health hazards of smoking, education, and demography,
etc. In fact, data for these variables are not currently available. However, it is
hoped that these issues will be addressed in the future.
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Appendix: Data
Consumer Price Index, Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Public Manage-
ment, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications, Japan. Annual Report on
the Consumer Price Index, 1955-2003.
Consumer Price Index of Cigarettes, Statistics Bureau, Ministry of
Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications, Japan. ”Sub-
group Index for Japan.” Annual Report on the Consumer Price Index, 1955-
2003.
Nominal Household Disposable Income, Economic Planning Agency,
Government of Japan. Report on National Accounts, 1953-2003.
Nominal Retail Cigarette Prices, Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Public
Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications, Japan. ”Nation-
wide Uniform Prices or Charges” Monthly Report on the Retail Price Survey,
2000.
Nominal Tax Revenues, Ministry of Finance, Government of Japan. Pub-
lic Finance Statistics, 1955-2003.
Nominal Cigarette Prices, Nominal Retail Cigarette Prices (2000) times
the consumer price index of cigarettes divided by the index (2000).
Per Capita Cigarette Consumption, Total cigarette consumption di-
vided by the Japanese population.
Population, Statistics Bureau and Statistics Center, Government of Japan.
Population estimates series, 1955-2003.
Real Household Disposable Income, Nominal Household Disposable
Income divided by the consumer price index.
Smoking Prevalence, Report on Smoking and Health, Ministry of Health
and Welfare, Japan, 1958-2000.
Total Cigarette Consumption, Japan Tobacco Association, 1955-2003.
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Figure 1: Smoking prevalence of Japanese male adults 1958-2000 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1
9
5
8
1
9
6
1
1
9
6
4
1
9
6
7
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
3
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
9
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
7
2
0
0
0
Source: Japan Tobacco Association
m
al
e 
ad
u
lt
s 
sm
o
ki
n
g 
p
re
va
le
n
ce
 (
p
er
ce
n
t)
aged 20-29
aged 30-39
aged 40-49 
aged 50-59
aged 60 and over
average
                
 
 
 
 
 
 
  22
Figure 2: Smoking prevalence of Japanese female adults 1958-2000 
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Figure 3: Real and nominal cigarette price 1955-2002 
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Figure 4: Real cigarette tax revenue and real cigarette price 1955-2002 
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Figure 5: Real cigarette consumption and real cigarette price 1955-2002 
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Table 1. Summary statistics: 1955-2003       
Period Variable Mean Std.Dev. Max. Min. 
Ct 142.900 29.079  174.850  80.000  
Pt 29.677 8.902  50.035  20.406  
Yearly         
(1955-2002) 
Yt 16.777 6.817  24.448  4.092  
Ct 35.672 7.183  49.719  19.407  
Pt 28.726 8.642  49.114  17.192  
Yt 3.179 2.278  6.280  0.154  
Quarterly   
(1955.01-2003.03) 
ΔYt 0.028 0.065  0.344  -0.183  
Ct 11.896 2.552  23.430  5.902  
Pt 28.734 8.626  49.591  17.153  
Yt 0.712 0.497  1.448  0.050  
Monthly     
(1955.01-2003.09) 
ΔYt 0.002 0.022  0.099  -0.136  
Note: Max means maximum value; Min means minimum value; Ct is divided by the 
population of aged 15 and over. 
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Table 2. Tests of unit roots (ADF test and Phillips-Perron test): 1955-2003   
ADF test Phillips-Perron test 
 Variable 
constant time lags test statistics constant time lags test statistics
 Ct yes no 2 -2.823
* yes no 1 -2.667* 
Yearly Pt yes no 2 -2.856
* yes no 2 -2.797* 
  Yt yes no 2 -2.764
* yes no 2 -2.909* 
Ct yes no 5 -2.670
* yes no 1 -2.506 
Pt yes no 4 -2.711
* yes no 2 -2.584* 
Yt yes yes 2 0.878 yes yes 2 1.179 
Quarterly 
ΔYt yes yes 2 -4.940
*** yes yes 2 -15.381*** 
Ct yes yes 2 -3.278
*** yes yes 2 -8.922*** 
Pt yes no 2 -2.610
* no no 2 -2.276** 
Yt yes yes 2 -0.068 yes yes 2 -0.889 
Monthly 
ΔYt yes yes 2 -20.081
*** yes yes 2 -52.633*** 
Note: *** means significant at the 1% level; ** means significant at the 5% level; * means 
significant at the 10% level.  
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Table 3. Estimates of Myopic and Non-addiction Models, Dependent Variable=Ct, yearly data 
OLS 2SLS Independent 
variable non-addiction basic expanded basic expanded 
Constant 237.759*** 63.983*** 79.976*** 130.608** 139.943*** 
 (77.364) (2.864) (3.797) (2.696) (3.440) 
Ct-1  0.721
*** 0.665*** 0.445** 0.419** 
  (7.847) (7.721) (2.241) (2.508) 
Pt -3.196
*** -0.782** -0.010 -1.707** -0.724 
 (-32.197) (-2.452) (-0.024) (-2.469) (-1.182) 
Pt+1   -1.057
***  -1.191*** 
      (-2.844)   (-2.883) 
Adjusted R2 0.956 0.980 0.984 0.973 0.982 
Wu ratio - - - 3.295 2.971 
Observations 48 47 46 46 45 
Note: *** means significant at the 1% level; ** means significant at the 5% level; * means 
significant at the 10% level; The instruments of `basic' 2SLS column: the second lag of price 
and other exogenous variables. The critical 5% value for Chi-Square distribution with 3 
degrees of freedom is 7.815; The instruments of `expanded' 2SLS column: the first lag and 
the first lead of price and other exogenous variables; The critical 5% value for Chi-Square 
distribution with 4 degrees of freedom is 9.488. 
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Table 4. Estimates of Rational Addiction Models, Dependent Variable=Ct, yearly, quarterly and monthly 
data 
Yearly Quarterly Monthly Independent 
variable OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
Constant 48.1926** 43.712* 26.642*** 20.312* 10.595*** 7.588* 
 (2.469) (1.656) (5.489) (1.777) (15.487) (1.929) 
Ct-1 0.394
*** 0.441*** 0.388*** 0.376** 0.364*** 0.342*** 
 (4.681) (3.103) (5.098) (2.549) (13.301) (4.065) 
Ct+1 0.392
*** 0.366** 0.184** 0.290** 0.114*** 0.277* 
 (4.001) (2.12) (2.603) (2.272) (4.826) (1.675) 
Pt -0.679
** -0.609* -0.364*** -0.281* -0.147*** -0.104* 
 (-2.540) (-1.740) (-5.211) (-1.731) (-14.440) (-1.854) 
Yt 0.523 0.49     
 (0.844) (0.62)     
ΔYt   1.485 1.455 -2.230
** -2.480** 
   (0.807) (0.793) (-2.316) (-2.356) 
Time -0.256 -0.253 -0.005 -0.004 -0.001*** -0.000 
  (-1.062) (-0.781) (-1.415) (-0.930) (-2.876) (-0.767) 
4θ2β<1 (-2.486) (-1.491) (-7.455) (-2.340) (-24.516) (-2.528) 
φ1<1 (-3.497) (-2.068) (-9.786) (-3.957) (-34.015) (-3.280) 
φ2>1 (2.005) (1.264) (2.904) (1.255) (8.025) (2.121) 
short-run ε -0.338*** -0.293** -0.397*** -0.387*** -0.421*** -0.406*** 
 (-3.439) (-1.999) (-6.255) (-2.717) (-18.124) (-4.679) 
long-run ε -0.659*** -0.655*** -0.686*** -0.680*** -0.679*** -0.658*** 
  (-4.064) (-3.023) (-16.265) (-11.871) (-36.825) (-15.526) 
Adjusted R2 0.991 0.990 0.956 0.973 0.962 0.955 
Wu ratio - 0.219 - 2.398 - 1.076 
Observations 46 45 193 187 583 576 
Note: *** means significant at the 1% level; ** means significant at the 5% level; * means 
significant at the 10% level; The instruments of `yearly’ 2SLS column: the second and the 
first lag of price, the lead of price, the lag of Yt, tax rate and other exogenous variables. The 
critical 5% value for Chi-Square distribution with 6 degrees of freedom is 12.592; The 
instruments of `quarterly’ 2SLS column: three lags and two leads of price, the lag of ?Yt, 
five leads and two lags of tax rate and other exogenous variables. The critical 5% value for 
Chi-Square distribution with 8 degrees of freedom is 15.507; The instruments of `monthly’ 
  30
2SLS column: three lags and the lead of price, seven lags of ?Yt, and other exogenous 
variables, where twenty dummies for inventory are included in the exogenous variables. The 
critical 5% value for Chi-Square distribution with 26 degrees of freedom is 38.885. 
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Table 5. Estimates of tax revenue and reduction of pure social cost  (unit: billion yen per fiscal year)
year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 …
estimates 26.651 26.323 26.199 26.146 25.196 24.844 …
realized 27.36 26.44 26.59 26.021 25.196 24.844 …
reduction 100.769 135.461 148.683 154.314 255.083 292.398 …
Note: estimates: estimated tax revenue from the `Tobacco Special Tax'; realized: realized tax 
revenue from the `Tobacco Special Tax'; reduction: estimated reduction of pure social cost 
from the `Tobacco Special Tax' and `Tobacco Health Tax'. 
